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57	
MASTERPIECE	CAKESHOP,	LTD.	V.	COLORADO	CIVIL	
RIGHTS	COMMISSION	
	 Mike	Steenson†		The	website	for	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	says,	“Jack	Phillips	creates	a	masterpiece.	Custom	designs	are	his	specialty:	If	you	can	think	it	up,	Jack	can	make	it	into	a	cake!”1	Well,	not	quite.	He	can	bake	a	cake.	He	can	bake	a	wedding	cake.	He	can	design	a	wedding	cake.	But	he	won’t	make	a	cake	for	a	same-sex	couple	seeking	to	celebrate	their	marriage.2	Masterpiece	 Cakeshop,	 Ltd.,	 is	 a	 bakery	 located	 in	 a	 suburb	 of	Denver.3	Jack	Phillips	is	the	owner	and	operator	of	the	bakery.4	He	is	an	expert	baker.5	The	bakery	“offers	a	variety	of	baked	goods,”	includ-ing	elaborate	cakes	 that	are	custom-designed	 for	special	events,	 in-cluding	weddings	and	birthday	parties.6			Jack	Phillips	is	also	a	devout	Christian.7	He	seeks	to	“honor	God	through	his	work	at	Masterpiece	Cakeshop.”8	One	of	his	religious	be-liefs	is	that	“God’s	intention	for	marriage	from	the	beginning	of	history	is	that	it	is	and	should	be	the	union	of	one	man	and	one	woman.”9	For	Phillips,	creating	a	wedding	cake	for	a	same-sex	couple	would	be	the	
	
        †	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mike	Steenson,	Bell	Distinguished	Professor	of	Law,	Mitchell	Hamline	School	of	Law.	
	 1.	 Welcome!,	MASTERPIECE	CAKESHOP,	http://masterpiececakes.com	[https://perma.cc/UJ7H-T3JC].	
	 2.	 Masterpiece	Cakeshop,	Ltd.	v.	Colorado	Civil	Rights	Commission,	138	S.	Ct.	1719,	1724	(2018).		
	 3.	 Id.	
	 4.	 Id.	
	 5.	 Id.	
	 6.	 Id.	
	 7.	 Id.	
	 8.	 Id.	
	 9.	 Id.	
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same	as	participating	in	a	celebration	that	conflicts	with	those	deeply	held	religious	beliefs.10	Charlie	Craig	and	Dave	Mullins	planned	on	marrying	in	2012,	at	a	time	when	Colorado	did	not	recognize	same-sex	marriage.11	They	intended	to	legally	marry	in	Massachusetts	and	then	have	a	reception	later	in	Colorado.12	They	went	to	the	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	to	order	a	cake	for	their	wedding	from	Phillips.13	Phillips	told	them	“that	he	does	not	‘create’	wedding	cakes	for	same-sex	weddings.”	Phillips	“ex-plained	 that	 ‘I’ll	 make	 your	 birthday	 cakes,	 shower	 cakes,	 sell	 you	cookies	 and	 brownies,	 I	 just	 don’t	 make	 cakes	 for	 same	 sex	 wed-dings.’”14	Colorado’s	Anti-Discrimination	Act	(CADA)	makes	it	a	discrimi-natory	practice	“for	a	person,	directly	or	indirectly,	to	refuse,	withhold	from,	or	deny	to	an	individual	or	a	group,	because	of	.	.	.	sexual	orien-tation	.	.	.	the	full	and	equal	enjoyment	of	the	goods,	services,	facilities,	privileges,	advantages,	or	accommodations	of	a	place	of	public	accom-modation.”15	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	is	a	place	of	public	accommoda-tion,	which	is	defined	“broadly	to	include	any	‘place	of	business	en-gaged	in	any	sales	to	the	public	and	any	place	offering	services	.	.	.	to	the	public.’”16	Churches,	synagogues,	mosques,	or	other	places	used	principally	for	religious	purposes	are	excluded	from	the	definition.17	Craig	and	Mullins	filed	a	complaint	with	the	Colorado	Civil	Rights	Division,	which	opened	an	investigation	into	the	complaint.18	The	di-vision	“found	probable	cause	that	Phillips	had	violated	CADA	and	re-ferred	the	case	to	the	Civil	Rights	Commission.”19	The	commission	in-itiated	 a	 formal	 hearing	 before	 an	 administrative	 law	 judge,	 who	found	that	Phillips	had	violated	CADA.20	That	decision	was	affirmed	by	the	commission.21	“The	Commission	ordered	Phillips	to	‘cease	and	desist	from	discriminating	against	.	.	.	same-sex	couples	by	refusing	to	sell	 them	 wedding	 cakes	 or	 	 any	 product	 [it]	 would	 sell	 to		
	 10.	 Id.	
	 11.	 Id.	
	 12.	 Id.	
	 13.	 Id.	
	 14.	 Id.	
	 15.	 Id.	at	1725	(quoting	COLO.	REV.	STAT.	ANN.	§	24–34–601(2)(a)	(2017)).	
	 16.	 Id.	(quoting	COLO.	REV.	STAT.	ANN.	§	24–34–601(1)).	
	 17.	 Id.	
	 18.	 Id.	
	 19.	 Id.	at	1726.	
	 20.	 Id.	
	 21.	 Id.	
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heterosexual	 couples.’”22	 The	 commission	 also	 required	 Phillips	 to	provide	“comprehensive	staff	training	on	the	Public	Accommodations	section	of	CADA,”	and	to	provide	quarterly	compliance	reports	for	two	years.23		 During	the	hearing,	some	of	the	individual	commissioners	made	comments	that	exhibited	a	“hostility	toward	the	sincere	religious	be-liefs	that	motivated	[Phillips’s]	objection.”24	At	various	points	in	the	meeting,	“commissioners	endorsed	the	view	that	religious	beliefs	can-not	legitimately	be	carried	into	the	public	sphere	or	commercial	do-main,	 implying	that	religious	beliefs	and	persons	are	 less	 than	fully	welcome	 in	Colorado’s	business	 community.”25	One	of	 the	 commis-sioners	suggested	that	Phillips	could	believe	“what	he	want[ed],”	but	he	could	not	“act	on	his	religious	beliefs”	if	he	wanted	to	do	business	in	Colorado.26	The	clincher	was	a	statement	by	a	commissioner	that	“[f]reedom	of	religion	and	religion	has	been	used	to	justify	all	kinds	of	discrimi-nation	 throughout	history,	whether	 it	be	 slavery,	whether	 it	be	 the	holocaust,”	and	“to	me	it	is	one	of	the	most	despicable	pieces	of	rhet-oric	 that	people	 can	use	 to—to	use	 their	 religion	 to	hurt	others.”27	That	statement,	stacked	on	the	earlier	statements,	and	reinforced	by	the	failure	of	any	commissioner	to	counter	those	statements,	provided	the	basis	for	the	Court’s	conclusion	that	the	statements	were	“inap-propriate	for	a	Commission	charged	with	the	solemn	responsibility	of	fair	and	neutral	enforcement	of	Colorado’s	antidiscrimination	law—a	law	that	protects	against	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion	as	well	as	sexual	orientation.”28	Hostility	toward	religion	was	not	the	only	problem.	The	second	concern	was	the	commission’s	disparate	treatment	of	similarly	situ-ated	cases	involving	a	request	by	William	Jack	that	three	Denver	bak-eries	create	two	Bible-shaped	cakes	that	were	to	be	inscribed	with	de-rogatory	 messages	 about	 gays.29	 One	 requested	 inscription	 read,	“Homosexuality	is	a	detestable	sin.	Leviticus	18:2.”30	The	Civil	Rights		
	 22.	 Id.			
	 23.	 Id.			
	 24.	 Id.	at	1729.	
	 25.	 Id.	
	 26.	 Id.	
	 27.	 Id.	
	 28.	 Id.	
	 29.	 Id.	at	1730.	
	 30.	 Id.	at	1749	(Ginsburg,	J.,	dissenting).			
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Division	found	no	violation	in	the	bakers’	refusals	to	create	the	cakes,	concluding	that	the	bakers	did	not	refuse	to	create	the	cakes	because	of	Jack’s	creed,	but	rather	because	of	the	offensive	nature	of	the	mes-sage	he	wanted	inscribed	on	the	cake.31	In	Phillips’s	case,	the	commission	concluded	that	any	message	a	wedding	 cake	 carried	would	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 customer,	 rather	than	to	Phillips.32	The	Civil	Rights	Division	did	not	consider	that	point	in	the	other	cases	involving	anti-gay	marriage	symbolism,	however.33	The	division	also	found	that	the	three	bakers	in	the	Jack	cases	did	not	violate	CADA,	in	part	because	the	bakers	were	willing	to	sell	other	products	to	the	customer.34	In	the	Phillips	case,	the	commission	con-sidered	 that	 Phillips’s	 willingness	 to	 sell	 other	 bakery	 products	 to	gays	and	lesbians	was	irrelevant.35	The	Supreme	Court	thought	that	this	disparate	treatment	could	reasonably	be	interpreted	as	being	“inconsistent	as	to	the	question	of	whether	 speech	 is	 involved,	 quite	 apart	 from	 whether	 the	 cases	should	ultimately	be	distinguished,”	and	that	a	principled	rationale	for	the	difference	in	treatment	could	not	be	based	on	the	government’s	assessment	of	the	offensiveness	of	the	messages.36	The	dual	hostility	justified	reversal	of	the	Colorado	Court	of	Ap-peals.37	So,	are	there	guidelines	for	future	cases	where	there	may	be	no	hostility?	Justice	Kennedy	addressed	this	question	in	the	Court’s	majority	opinion	by	stating:	The	outcome	of	cases	like	this	in	other	circumstances	must	await	further	elaboration	in	the	courts,	all	in	the	context	of	recognizing	that	these	disputes	must	be	resolved	with	toler-ance,	without	undue	disrespect	to	sincere	religious	beliefs,	and	without	subjecting	gay	persons	to	indignities	when	they	seek	goods	and	services	in	an	open	market.38	The	statement	is	aspirational,	but	not	concrete.			In	her	concurrence,	Justice	Kagan	agreed	with	Justice	Kennedy	in	concluding	that	there	is	no	principled	distinction	between	the	Phillips	case	 and	 the	 three	 Jack	 cases	 “based	 on	 the	 government’s	 own		
	 31.	 Id.	at	1731	(majority	opinion).	
	 32.	 Id.	at	1730.	
	 33.	 Id.	
	 34.	 Id.	
	 35.	 Id.	
	 36.	 Id.	
	 37.	 Id.	at	1732.	
	 38.	 Id.	
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assessment	of	offensiveness.”39	She	understood	the	Court’s	opinion	to	be	limited	to	the	commission’s	reasoning	in	the	case.40	Justice	 Kagan	 found	 the	 result	 disquieting	 because	 she	 saw	 a	clear	basis	for	distinguishing	the	three	Jack	cases,	other	than	the	gov-ernment’s	 assessment	of	 the	offensiveness	of	 the	message:	William	Jack	requested	that	the	bakers	make	a	cake	(one	denigrating	gay	peo-ple	and	same-sex	marriage)	that	the	bakers	would	not	have	made	for	any	customer.41	“In	refusing	that	request,	the	bakers	did	not	single	out	Jack	because	of	his	religion,	but	instead	treated	him	in	the	same	way	they	would	have	treated	anyone	else—just	as	CADA	requires.”42	Craig	and	Mullins,	in	contrast,	asked	Phillips	to	make	a	wedding	cake	that	he	would	have	made	for	an	opposite-sex	couple.43	In	doing	so,	Phillips	violated	CADA’s	principle	of	“full	and	equal	enjoyment”	of	public	ac-commodations	of	customers	without	regard	to	their	sexual	orienta-tion.44	Justice	Kagan	thought	that	“[t]he	different	outcomes	in	the	Jack	cases	and	the	Phillips	case	could	thus	have	been	justified	by	a	plain	reading	and	neutral	application	of	Colorado	 law—untainted	by	any	bias	against	a	religious	belief.”45	Justice	Ginsburg,	in	a	dissent	joined	by	Justice	Sotomayor,	disa-greed	 that	 the	comments	of	 some	of	 the	commissioners	were	suffi-cient	 to	 show	bias,	 but	 agreed	 that	 the	 case	was	 straightforward.46	Phillips	refused	to	bake	a	cake	that	he	would	have	sold	to	a	heterosex-ual	couple,	but	the	bakeries	in	the	Jack	cases	would	not	have	made	the	requested	cakes	for	anyone.47	Not	so	fast,	Justice	Gorsuch	said	in	his	concurring	opinion.48	He	found	that	the	two	sets	of	cases	shared	“all	legally	salient	features.”49	The	impact	on	the	customer	was	the	same.50	In	each	case	the	bakers		
	 39.	 Id.	at	1733	(Kagan,	J.,	concurring).	
	 40.	 Id.	
	 41.	 Id.	at	1733.	
	 42.	 Id.	
	 43.	 Id.	
	 44.	 Id.	
	 45.	 Id.	
	 46.	 See	id.	at	1748	(Ginsburg,	J.,	dissenting)	(“There	is	much	in	the	Court’s	opin-ion	which	which	I	agree.	.	.	.	I	strongly	disagree,	however,	with	the	Court’s	conclusion	that	Craig	and	Mullins	should	lose	this	case.	All	of	the	above-quoted	statements	point	in	the	opposite	direction.”).	
	 47.	 Id.	at	1750.	
	 48.	 Id.	at	1734	(Gorsuch,	J.,	concurring).	
	 49.	 Id.	at	1735.	
	 50.	 See	id.	
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refused	 service	 to	 customers	 who	 were	 statutorily	 protected,	 one	based	on	religious	faith	and	one	based	on	sexual	orientation.51	In	each	case	 the	bakers	 refused	 service	 to	 adhere	 to	 their	personal	 convic-tions.52	Further,	Justice	Gorsuch	wrote,	“there’s	no	indication	the	bak-ers	actually	 intended	 to	 refuse	 service	because	of	 a	 customer’s	pro-tected	characteristic.”53	The	bakers	explained	that	they	would	not	sell	the	 cakes	 to	 anyone	 (cakes	with	 a	 derogatory	message	 in	 the	 Jack	cases	 and	 cakes	 to	 celebrate	 same-sex	 weddings	 in	 the	 Phillips	case).54	Therefore,	it	was	the	kind	of	cake	that	prompted	the	refusals	to	 sell,	 rather	 than	 any	 characteristic	 of	 the	 people	 requesting	 the	cake.55	And,	if	the	refusal	by	Phillips	was	“inextricably	tied”	to	a	pro-tected	class	(sexual	orientation),	then	so	were	the	refusals	of	the	bak-ers	 in	 the	 three	 Jack	 cases	 (people	 of	 faith).56	 In	 each	 case,	 refusal	would	be	based	on	discrimination	against	a	protected	class.57	Furthermore,	Justice	Gorsuch	said	that	suggesting	that	the	case	is	only	about	“wedding	cakes”	and	not	a	wedding	cake	celebrating	same-sex	marriage	is	not	only	unworkable,	but	also	highlights	the	problem	in	the	case:	the	same	level	of	generality	must	be	applied	in	each	case.58	The	commission	did	not	declare	that	the	cakes	William	Jack	requested	were	about	weddings	generally,	and	that	because	all	wedding	cakes	are	the	same	the	bakers	had	to	bake	them.	Instead,	the	commission	accepted	the	views	of	the	bakers	that	the	specific	cakes	requested	by	Jack	would	have	conveyed	a	message	 the	bakers	 found	offensive	 to	their	convictions.59	That	justified	the	bakers’	refusal	to	provide	ser-vice.	 Justice	 Gorsuch	 concluded	 that	 because	 the	 commission	 took	that	position	in	the	three	Jack	cases,	it	had	to	do	the	same	in	the	Phil-lips	case.60	Wedding	cakes	convey	a	message.61	 If	 the	bakers	 in	 the	
Jack	 cases	 were	 not	 sanctioned,	 then	 Phillips	 could	 not	 be	 sanc-tioned.62	 There	 can	 be	 no	 picking	 and	 choosing—no	 sliding	 scale	
	
	 51.	 Id.	
	 52.	 Id.	
	 53.	 Id.	(emphasis	in	original).	
	 54.	 Id.	
	 55.	 Id.	at	1736.	
	 56.	 Id.	
	 57.	 Id.	
	 58.	 Id.	at	1738–39.	
	 59.	 Id.	at	1737–38.	
	 60.	 Id.	at	1740.	
	 61.	 Id.	at	1738.	
	 62.	 Id.	at	1740.	
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where	a	“Goldilocks	rule”	is	applied	until	the	right	level	of	generality	is	applied	in	each	case.63	The	Kagan-Gorsuch	exchange	obviously	matters,	but	how	much	will	depend	on	whether	similar	hostility	to	religion	can	be	established	in	other	cases.	Hostile	comments	by	individuals	charged	with	enforce-ment	of	civil	rights	statutes	and	disparate	treatment	will	be	key	in	de-termining	whether	 there	 is	a	violation	of	 the	 free-exercise	rights	of	those	who	refuse	service	to	individuals	based	on	protected	character-istics.	The	principle	the	Court	applied	in	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	is	an	important	 exception	 to	 the	 enforcement	of	 civil	 rights	 laws	against	people	with	certain	religious	exceptions,	but	it	may	be	a	narrow	one.	The	inquiry	is	not	over	even	if	there	is	no	hostility,	however.	Phil-lips	also	argued	that	his	free-speech	rights	were	violated	by	the	com-mission.64	While	the	majority	bypassed	the	speech	issue	because	of	a	lack	of	clarity	in	the	record	as	to	whether	Phillips	refused	to	bake	a	cake	with	a	message	or	just	a	cake,	Justice	Thomas,	in	an	opinion	joined	by	Jus-tice	Gorsuch,	nonetheless	proceeded	to	consider	the	speech	issue.65	Justice	Thomas	initially	indicated	that	while	the	commissioners’	com-ments	were	disturbing,	the	disparate	treatment	by	the	commission	of	the	three	Jack	cases	and	the	Phillips	case	was	sufficient	to	justify	re-versal.66	Justice	Thomas	wrote	further	to	emphasize	that,	in	his	opin-ion,	the	commission	violated	Phillips’s	free-speech	rights.67	The	key	elements	in	the	free-speech	claim	are	that	baking	wed-ding	cakes	is	expressive	conduct,	and	that	 if	government	requires	a	person	to	carry	either	its	own	or	someone	else’s	message,	that	is	com-pelled	speech	in	violation	of	the	First	Amendment.68	If	it	is	compelled	speech,	strict	scrutiny	applies.69	There	is	a	contrary	argument	that	the	Court’s	cases	 involving	the	regulation	of	conduct	with	an	 incidental	impact	 on	 speech	 will	 trigger	 only	 intermediate	 scrutiny.70	 Justice	
	
	 63.	 Id.	at	1738.	
	 64.	 Id.	at	1727.	
	 65.	 Id.	at	1740	(Thomas,	J.,	concurring).	
	 66.	 Id.	at	1740	(“Although	the	Commissioners’	comments	are	certainly	disturb-ing,	 the	 discriminatory	 application	 of	 Colorado’s	 public-accommodations	 law	 is	enough	on	its	own	to	violate	Phillips’	rights.”).	
	 67.	 Id.	at	1740.	
	 68.	 Id.	at	1743–44.	
	 69.	 Id.	at	1745–46.	
	 70.	 Id.	at	1746.	
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Thomas	 rejected	 the	 intermediate	 scrutiny	 standard,	which	applies	only	in	cases	where	expression	is	not	targeted.71	While	 the	 Colorado	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 did	 not	 decide	 the	 case	based	on	a	strict	scrutiny	standard,	and	Justice	Thomas	initially	said	that	he	would	not	do	so,	he	did	reject	the	argument	that	one	of	the	potential	justifications	for	the	law—that	application	of	the	CADA	pre-cludes	denigration	of	same-sex	couples—would	be	sufficient.72	These	sorts	of	justifications	are	“completely	foreign	to	our	free-speech	juris-prudence,”	Justice	Thomas	wrote.73	“If	there	is	a	bedrock	principle	un-derlying	the	First	Amendment,	it	is	that	the	government	may	not	pro-hibit	the	expression	of	an	idea	simply	because	society	finds	the	idea	itself	offensive	or	disagreeable.”74	In	concluding,	Justice	Thomas	repeated	his	warning	from	Ober-
gefell	v.	Hodges	that	the	Court’s	decision	would	“‘inevitabl[y]	.	.	.	come	into	conflict’	with	religious	liberty,	‘as	individuals	.	.	.	are	confronted	with	demands	to	participate	in	and	endorse	civil	marriages	between	same-sex	couples.’”75	He	saw	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	as	proof	“that	the	conflict	has	already	emerged.”76	While	Phillips’s	right	to	“religious	lib-erty	has	lived	to	fight	another	day,”	“in	future	cases,	the	freedom	of	speech	could	be	essential	to	preventing	Obergefell	from	being	used	to	‘stamp	out	every	vestige	of	dissent’	and	‘vilify	Americans	who	are	un-willing	to	assent	to	the	new	orthodoxy.’”77	The	Court’s	cases	that	have	prohibited	government	from	discrim-inating	based	on	sexual	orientation	have	turned	on	animus	or	mere	moral	disapproval	by	government.78	While	the	controlling	principles		
	 71.	 Id.	
	 72.	 Id.			
	 73.	 Id.	
	 74.	 Id.	(quoting	Texas	v.	Johnson,	491	U.S.	397,	414	(1989)).	
	 75.	 Id.	at	1748	(quoting	Obergefell	v.	Hodges,	135	S.	Ct.	2584,	2638	(2015)	(al-terations	in	original)).	
	 76.	 Id.	at	1747–48.	
	 77.	 Id.	at	1748	(quoting	Obergefell,	135	S.	Ct.	at	2584	(Alito,	J.,	dissenting)).	
	 78.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Windsor,	570	U.S.	744,	770	(2013)	(restricting	U.S.	federal	interpretation	of	“marriage”	and	“spouse”	to	apply	only	to	opposite-sex	un-ions,	by	Section	3	of	the	Defense	of	Marriage	Act	(DOMA)	unconstitutional	under	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fifth	Amendment);	Lawrence	v.	Texas,	539	U.S.	558,	582	(2003)	(striking	down	sodomy	law	in	Texas,	and	by	extension,	invalidating	sodomy	laws	in	thirteen	other	states,	making	same-sex	sexual	activity	legal	in	every	U.S.	state	and	territory);	Romer	v.	Evans,	517	U.S.	620,	632	(1996)	(holding	state	amendment	in	Colorado	preventing	protected	status	based	upon	homosexuality	or	bisexuality	un-constitutional,	as	it	did	not	satisfy	the	rational	basis	review	to	comply	with	the	Equal	Protection	Clause).	
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have	perhaps	been	less	than	clear	in	those	cases,	the	decisions	have	drawn	 fire	 in	 dissenting	 and	 concurring	 opinions	 that	 range	 from	claims	 that	 the	 decisions	 are	 the	 product	 of	 the	 “homosexual	agenda,”79	 to	 Justice	 Thomas’s	 claim	 in	Masterpiece	 Cakeshop	 that	
Obergefell	is	part	of	an	attempt	to	superimpose	a	new	orthodoxy	on	the	country.80	That	is	one	view,	and	it	informs	how	some	justices	view	the	 issues	 that	 arise	 in	 these	 cases,	 but	 it	 certainly	 doesn’t	 resolve	them.	So,	what	next?	In	State	v.	Arlene’s	Flowers,	Inc.,	 the	Washington	Supreme	Court	held	 that	a	 florist	who	refused	 to	create	a	 floral	ar-rangement	for	a	same-sex	couple	violated	Washington’s	Anti-Discrim-ination	Act,	rejecting	the	florist’s	First	Amendment	arguments	along	the	way.81	The	 case	 arose	 when	 Barronelle	 Stutzman,	 the	 president	 and	owner	of	Arlene’s	Flowers,	declined	 to	 serve	Robert	 Ingersoll,	who	planned	to	marry	his	partner,	Curt	Freed.82	While	Ingersoll	had	been	a	 steady	 customer	 at	 Arlene’s	 for	 some	 nine	 years,	 Stutzman	 told	Ingersoll	that	she	could	not	provide	flowers	for	his	wedding	because	of	 “her	 relationship	with	 Jesus	 Christ.”83	 An	 “active	member	 of	 the	Southern	Baptist	church,”	Stutzman’s	“sincerely	held	religious	beliefs	included	a	belief	that	marriage	can	only	be	between	one	man	and	one	woman.”84	Stutzman	was	willing	to	sell	bulk	flowers	and	“raw	materials”	to	Ingersoll	and	Freed,	but	her	belief	was	that	selling	custom	floral	ar-rangements	and	accompanying	customer	 service	 constitutes	an	en-dorsement	of	marriage	equality	for	same-sex	couples,	which	was	in-consistent	with	her	religious	principles.85	After	 learning	of	Stutzman’s	 refusal	 to	 sell	 flowers	 to	 Ingersoll	and	Reed,	the	Attorney	General’s	office	sent	a	letter	to	Stutzman	seek-ing	 her	 agreement	 to	 cease	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sexual		
	 79.	 Lawrence,	 539	 U.S.	 at	 602	 (Scalia,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (“Today’s	 opinion	 is	 the	product	of	a	Court,	which	is	the	product	of	a	law-profession	culture,	that	has	largely	signed	on	to	the	so-called	homosexual	agenda,	by	which	I	mean	the	agenda	promoted	by	some	homosexual	activists	directed	at	eliminating	the	moral	opprobrium	that	has	traditionally	attached	to	homosexual	conduct.”).			
	 80.	 Masterpiece	Cakeshop,	138	S.Ct.	at	1747	(Thomas,	J.,	concurring).		 81.	 389	P.3d	543,	552–53,	556–60	(Wash.	2017).	
	 82.	 Arlene’s	Flowers,	389	P.3d	543,	548	(Wash.	2017).	
	 83.	 Id.	at	549.	
	 84.	 Id.	
	 85.	 Id.	at	550.	
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orientation.86	 She	 was	 told	 that	 there	 would	 be	 no	 formal	 action	against	her	if	she	complied.87	She	was	asked	in	the	letter	to	sign	an	“Assurance	of	Discontinuance,”	which	stated	that	she	would	not	dis-criminate	with	respect	to	“provision	of	wedding	floral	services.”88	She	declined.89	 The	 State	 filed	 a	 complaint	 in	 superior	 court	 under	 the	Washington	Law	Against	Discrimination	(WLAD)	and	the	Consumer	Protection	Act,	 seeking	 an	 injunction	 and	other	 relief.90	 Stutzman’s	answer	asserted	a	variety	of	defenses,	 including	 that	her	 refusal	 to	provide	wedding	services	to	Ingersoll	was	protected	by	the	state	and	federal	constitutions.91	She	argued	that	application	of	the	law	in	her	case	violated	her	 right	 to	 free	exercise	of	 religion,	 free	 speech,	 and	freedom	of	association.92	The	trial	court	found	for	the	plaintiffs	and	awarded	permanent	injunctive	relief	and	monetary	damages	to	Inger-soll	and	Freed.93	Stutzman	was	also	found	personally	liable.94	The	defendants	argued	on	direct	appeal	to	the	Washington	Su-preme	Court	that	their	constitutional	rights	under	the	state	and	fed-eral	 constitutions	were	 violated.95	 Putting	 aside	 the	 state	 constitu-tional	 claims—because	 they	provided	no	greater	protection	 for	 the	rights	 Stutzman	 asserted	 than	 under	 the	 federal	 constitution—the	key	 issues	 were	 whether	 her	 rights	 to	 free	 exercise,	 freedom	 of	speech,	 and	 freedom	 of	 association	 were	 violated.96	 The	 court	 re-jected	all	of	those	claims.97	The	 court	 recognized	 the	 Spence98	 standard	 for	 determining	whether	 conduct	 is	 protected	 expression,	 but	 noted	 that	 “[r]ecent	cases	have	characterized	this	as	an	inquiry	into	whether	the	conduct	at	 issue	was	 ‘inherently	 expressive.’”99	The	 court	 rejected	 the	 free-speech	 claim	 based	 on	 its	 conclusion	 that	 “[t]he	 decision	 to	 either		
	 86.	 Id.	
	 87.	 Id.	
	 88.	 Id.			
	 89.	 Id.	
	 90.	 Id.	
	 91.	 Id.	
	 92.	 Id.	
	 93.	 Id.	
	 94.	 Id.	
	 95.	 Id.	at	550–51.	
	 96.	 Id.	at	556–67.	
	 97.	 Id.		 98.	 Spence	v.	Washington,	418	U.S.	405,	410–11	(1974).	
	 99.	 Arlene’s	Flowers,	389	P.3d	at	557	(quoting	Rumsfeld	v.	Forum	for	Acad.	&	Institutional	Rights,	Inc.	(FAIR),	547	U.S.	47,	64	(2006)).	
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provide	or	refuse	 to	provide	 flowers	 for	a	wedding	does	not	 inher-ently	express	a	message	about	that	wedding.”100	The	 court	 applied	Employment	Division	 v.	 Smith101	 in	 rejecting	the	free-exercise	claim.102		WLAD	is	a	neutral	law	of	general	applica-tion.103	That	triggers	rational	basis	review,	which	the	court	found	was	readily	met	because	WLAD	“is	rationally	related	to	the	government’s	legitimate	 interest	 in	 ensuring	 equal	 access	 to	 public	 accommoda-tions.”104	The	Washington	Supreme	Court	noted	Spence,	but	applied	what	it	thought	to	be	an	evolving	standard	drawn	from	Rumsfeld	v.	Forum	
for	 Academic	 and	 Institutional	 Rights,	 Inc.105	 in	 asking	whether	 the	conduct	is	“inherently	expressive.”106	Given	the	lack	of	clarity	in	the	standard,107	it	may	make	little	difference	which	of	the	two	standards	applies.	Stutzman	and	Arlene’s	Flowers	petitioned	the	Court	for	a	writ	of	certiorari.	The	Court	granted	the	petition	and	In	Arlene’s	Flowers,	Inc.	v.	 Washington,108	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 vacated	 the	 Washington	 Su-preme	Court’s	judgment	and	remanded	“for	further	consideration	in	light	of	Masterpiece	Cakeshop.”	On	remand,	the	Washington	Supreme	Court	reaffirmed	its	origi-nal	decision.109	The	court	applied	the	Supreme	Court’s	admonition	in	
Masterpiece	Cakeshop	that	an	adjudicatory	body	must	act	neutrally	in	deciding	cases	involving	the	collision	of	public	accommodations	laws	prohibiting	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	and	the	free	exercise	rights	of	persons	refusing	service	based	on	 the	sexual	orientation	of	their	customers.110	
	
	 100.	 Id.		 101.	 494	U.S.	872	(1990).	
	 102.	 See	Arlene’s	Flowers,	389	P.3d	at	562.	
	 103.	 Id.	
	 104.	 Id.		 105.	 547	U.S.	47,	66	(2006)	(“[W]e	have	extended	First	Amendment	protection	only	to	conduct	that	is	inherently	expressive.”).	
	 106.	 Arlene’s	Flowers,	389	P.3d	at	557.	
	 107.	 See,	e.g.,	Chris	Chung,	Note,	Baking	a	Cake:	How	to	Draw	the	Line	Between	
Protected	Expressive	Conduct	and	Something	You	Do,	32	NOTRE	DAME	J.L.	ETHICS	&	PUB.	POL’Y	377,	378–79	(2018);	James	M.	McGoldrick,	Jr.,	Symbolic	Speech:	A	Message	from	
Mind	to	Mind,	61	OKLA.	L.	REV.	1,	8	(2008).		 108.	 Arlene’s	Flowers,	Inc.	v.	Washington,	138	S.	Ct.	2671	(2018).			 109.	 441	P.3d	1203	(Wash.	2019).			
	 110.	 Id.	at	1209.	
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After	a	detailed	review	of	“the	record	for	any	sign	of	intolerance	on	behalf	of	this	court	or	the	Benton	County	Superior	Court,	the	two	adjudicatory	bodies	to	consider	this	case,”	the	Washington	Supreme	Court	was	“confident	that	the	two	courts	gave	full	and	fair	considera-tion	to	this	dispute	and	avoided	animus	toward	religion.”111	The	court	held	that	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	 therefore	did	not	apply	because	the	adjudicatory	bodies	were	neutral	in	their	consideration	of	the	case.112	In	the	remainder	of	the	opinion	the	court	reaffirmed	the	positions	that	it	had	taken	in	Arlene’s	Flowers	(I).113	The	court	held	that	Stutz-man’s	free	speech	rights	were	not	violated	because	floral	design	is	not	art	and	is	not	inherently	expressive,	and	that	compelled	speech	is	not	involved	because	Stutzman	was	in	no	way	required	to	participate	in	a	same-sex	wedding.114	The	court	also	concluded	that	Stutzman’s	right	to	free	exercise	of	religion	was	not	violated,	rejecting	her	arguments	that	the	Washington	Law	Against	Discrimination	violated	her	right	to	free	exercise	of	religion	because	it	was	neutral	and	generally	applica-ble	because	of	 certain	patchwork	exemptions	 from	 the	Act	 for	 reli-giously	motivated	conduct.115	The	court	held	 that	her	hybrid	rights	claim	failed	because	the	only	fundamental	right	she	asserted	was	free	exercise,	and	that	claim	failed,	but	that	even	if	strict	scrutiny	were	ap-plied	the	standard	would	be	satisfied.116	The	Washington	Supreme	Court’s	 resolution	of	 the	 freedom	of	speech	and	expression	issues	clashes	with	Justice	Thomas’s	concur-ring	opinion	in	Masterpiece	Cakeshop.117	The	court	made	no	mention	of	his	opinion	in	its	decision	on	remand,	however.	The	conflicts	high-light	the	importance	of	the	speech	and	expression	issues.	While	 the	Washington	Supreme	Court	concluded	that	 floral	ar-rangements	do	not	meet	the	“inherently	expressive”	standard,	there	is	certainly	a	strong	historical	argument	that	floral	arrangements	are	an	important	form	of	expression.118	If	the	art	of	floral	arrangement	is		
	 111.	 Id.	at	1210.		
	 112.	 Id.	at	1216.			 113.	 389	P.3d	543	(Wash.	2017).		
	 114.	 Id.			 115.	 441	P.3d	at	1228.		
	 116.	 Id.	at	1236.	The	statute	granted	an	exemption	for	religious	organizations	and	was	inapplicable	to	employers	with	less	and	eight	employees	and	because	it	was	in-applicable	to	rentals	of	certain	multi-family	dwellings.	
	 117.	 Masterpiece	Cakeshop,	138	S.	Ct.	1719,	1740	(Thomas,	J.,	concurring).		
	 118.	 See	 Floral	 Decoration:	 Historical	 and	 Stylistic	 Developments,	ENCYCLOPÆDIA	BRITANNICA,	https://www.britannica.com/art/floral-decoration/Historical-and-stylistic-developments	[https://perma.cc/4UXJ-KAFR].	
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inherently	expressive,	it	is	a	short	half-step	to	the	compelled-speech	conclusion,	just	as	in	Masterpiece	Cakeshop.	Phillips	believed	that	cre-ation	of	a	wedding	cake	for	an	event	celebrating	something	directly	contrary	to	the	teachings	of	the	Bible	would	constitute	“a	personal	en-dorsement	and	participation	in	the	ceremony	and	relationship”	that	Craig	and	Mullins	were	entering	into.119	Stutzman	believed	that	the	creation	of	“floral	arrangements	is	to	use	her	‘imagination	and	artistic	skill	 to	 intimately	participate	 in	a	same-sex	wedding	ceremony.’”120	The	Washington	Supreme	Court	rejected	the	argument,	however.	Jus-tice	Thomas’s	concurrence	in	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	detailed	the	his-tory	and	uniqueness	of	wedding	cakes	and	the	inherent	expressive-ness	in	their	design,121	a	line	that	could	readily	be	followed	in	cases	involving	floral	designs	for	weddings.	The	Washington	Supreme	Court	applied	Hurley	and	FAIR	in	con-cluding	that	the	Stutzman’s	creation	of	floral	arrangements	was	not	inherently	expressive.	Justice	Thomas	found	FAIR	to	be	“far	afield”	be-cause	the	issue	was	whether	the	law	schools	could	be	required	to	pro-vide	a	forum	for	a	third	party’s	speech,	not	whether	the	government	could	force	an	entity	to	carry	someone	else’s	speech.122	If	strict	scrutiny	applies,	the	issue	is	whether	the	state’s	interest	in	eliminating	discrimination	based	on	sexual	orientation	is	a	compel-ling	interest.	Justice	Thomas	rejected	that	argument	in	his	opinion.	In-dividual	respondents	in	the	case	argued	that	Colorado	could	compel	Phillips’	speech	to	prevent	him	from	denigrating	the	dignity	of	same-sex	couples	and	prevent	 the	attendant	emotional	harm,123	an	argu-ment	that	Justice	Thomas	rejected	as	“completely	foreign	to	our	free-speech	 jurisprudence.”124	 The	 Washington	 Supreme	 Court	 did	 not	reach	the	issue	because	of	its	conclusion	that	Stutzman’s	free	speech	claim	 failed,	and	 it	did	not	 consider	O’Brien’s	 intermediate	 scrutiny	standard.			
		 119.	 Masterpiece	 Cakeshop,	 Ltd.	 v.	 Colo.	 Civil	 Rights	 Comm’n,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 1719,	1724	(2018).	
	 120.	 Arlene’s	Flowers,	389	P.3d	at	550	(internal	quotation	omitted).	Stutzman	also	stated	that	participating	in	a	Muslim	or	atheistic	wedding	would	not	be	an	endorse-ment	of	those	beliefs.	Id.		 121.	 138	S.	Ct.	at	1743.		
	 122.	 Id.	at	1744-45.		
	 123.	 Id.	
	 124.	 Id.	
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Of	course,	the	free-speech	argument	is	just	in	a	concurrence	by	Justice	Thomas,	 joined	by	 Justice	Gorsuch.125	His	 views	may	or	not	prevail,	but	 they	will	be	 tested	 in	 lower	state	and	 federal	courts.126	There	 are	 other	 considerations,	 however,	 even	 if	 the	 free	 exercise	claims	are	 rejected	because	of	 the	 inability	of	 a	person	operating	a	place	of	public	accommodation	to	demonstrate	that	treatment	under	an	anti-discrimination	act	violates	Masterpiece	Cakeshop’s	neutrality	mandate,	and	the	freedom	of	expression	arguments	are	rejected	be-cause	a	court	concludes	that	conduct	is	not	inherently	expressive.			In	some	states,	the	balance	will	tip	toward	those	providing	ser-vices	if	the	state	where	the	issue	arises	has	a	religious	freedom	resto-ration	 act,127	 or	 if	 the	 state	 constitution	 is	 interpreted	 to	 provide	
	
	 125.	 See	id.	at	1740.		 126.	 In	Klein	v.	Or.	Bureau	of	Labor	and	Indus.,	410	P.3d	1051	(Or.	Ct.	App.	Dec.	28,	2017),	rev.	denied,	434	P.3d	25	(2018)	(Or.	Sup.	Ct.	2018)	(Table),	 the	Oregon	Court	of	Appeals,	in	a	case	similar	to	Masterpiece	Cakeshop,			held	that	the	Kleins	vi-olated	Oregon’s	anti-discrimination	law.	The	Kleins	argued	that	their	rights	to	free-dom	of	 expression	 and	 free	 exercise	 of	 religion	were	 violated.	 The	 court	 rejected	those	arguments	 in	upholding	the	administrative	 law	judges’	award	of	damages	of	$75,000	 and	 $60,000	 to	 the	 same-sex	 couple.	 The	 Kleins	 petitioned	 the	 Supreme	Court	for	a	writ	of	certiorari.	The	Supreme	Court	granted	the	writ	and	vacated	and	remanded	 to	 the	 court	of	 appeals	 for	 further	 consideration	 in	 light	of	Masterpiece	
Cakeshop.	2019	WL	2493912	(2018).	
	 127.	 See	 State	 Religious	 Freedom	 Restoration	 Acts,	 NAT’L	 CONF.	 	 ST.LEGISLATURES,	(May	4,	 2017),	 http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx	[https://perma.cc/N38K-339X].	State	v.	Hershberger,	462	N.W.2d	393	(Minn.	1990)	is	an	excellent	example	of	a	state	applying	its	constitutional	provision	on	freedom	of	conscience	to	provide	greater	protection	for	the	free	exercise	of	reli-gion	than	does	the	U.S.	Constitution.	The	defendants	were	Old	Order	Amish	who	were	issued	citations	for	refusing	to	comply	with	a	Minnesota	statute	requiring	slow-mov-ing	vehicles	to	display	a	fluorescent	orange-red	triangular	sign	emblem	when	oper-ated	on	the	state’s	public	highways.	See	State	v.	Hershberger,	444	N.W.2d	282,	284–85	(Minn.	1989).	In	the	first	case,	the	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	applied	federal	law	in	concluding	that	their	right	to	free	exercise	of	religion	was	violated.	Id.	at	289.	The	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	granted	certiorari,	vacated	the	judgment,	and	re-manded	 for	 further	consideration	 in	 light	of	Employment	Division	v.	Smith.	 State	v.	Hershberger,	462	N.W.2d	393,	395	(Minn.	1990)	(hereinafter	“Hershberger	II”)	(cit-ing	Employment	Div.,	Dep’t	of	Human	Resources	of	Oregon	v.	Smith,	494	U.S.	872,	890	(1990)).	On	remand,	the	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	applied	the	Minnesota	Constitu-tion	in	holding	that	application	of	the	statute	to	the	defendants	violated	their	right	to	freedom	of	conscience	under	the	Minnesota	Constitution,	Art.	I,	§	16.	Id.	at	396–97.	Had	Smith	applied,	application	of	the	neutral	state	statute,	one	of	general	applicabil-ity,	would	not	have	violated	the	U.S.	Constitution,	absent	a	finding	of	a	“hybrid”	claim	coupling	 a	 free	 exercise	 claim	with	 another	 constitutional	 claim.	 Id.	at	 396.	 There	
14
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greater	protection	for	free	exercise	(or	freedom	of	conscience	under	some	constitutions).	In	those	cases,	strict	scrutiny	will	apply	to	gov-ernment	regulation	infringing	on	sincerely	held	religious	beliefs,	even	absent	any	showing	of	hostility	toward	religion	in	the	enforcement	of	a	state	law	against	discrimination.128	As	a	coda,	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	Kingdom	recently	de-cided	Lee	v.	Ashers	Baking	Co.	Ltd.,129	involving	roughly	similar	facts	to	Masterpiece	Cakeshop.	Although	Masterpiece	Cakeshop	was	decided	after	 the	hearing	 in	 the	Lee	 case,	 it	warranted	 a	postscript	 in	 Lady	Hale’s	opinion	in	Lee.130	Mr.	Lee,	who	is	gay,	volunteers	with	QueerSpace,	an	LGBT	organ-ization	in	Belfast.131	That	organization	held	a	private	event	to	mark	the	 end	 of	 anti-homophobia	 week	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.132	 Mr.	 Lee	asked	the	McArthurs	to	make	a	cake	for	him.133	He	wanted	a	cake	that	included	 a	 “picture	 of	 cartoon-like	 characters	 ‘Bert	 and	 Ernie,’	QueerSpace’s	logo,	and	the	headline	‘Support	Gay	Marriage.’”134	The	McArthurs	explained	in	a	phone	call	to	Mr.	Lee	that	their	business	is	a	Christian	business	 and	 that	 they	 could	not	 print	 the	 slogan.135	The	McArthurs’s	religious	belief	is	that	only	marriage	between	a	man	and	woman	is	consistent	with	biblical	teaching136	and	they	run	their	bak-ery	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	that	belief.137		 The	collision	of	rights	played	out	in	the	same	manner	as	in	Mas-
terpiece	Cakeshop.	Discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	with	respect	to	goods,	facilities,	or	services	is	prohibited	in	Northern	Ireland,	pursuant	to	the	UK’s	Equality	Act	and	implementing	regula-tions	in	Northern	Ireland.138	On	the	other	hand,	Articles	9	and	10	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	rights	parallel	the	U.S.	Constitu-tion’s	First	Amendment	in	protecting	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	
	were	possibilities,	as	the	Minnesota	Supreme	Court	noted,	but	it	nonetheless	decided	the	case	under	the	Minnesota	Constitution.	Id.	at	396–97.	
	 128.	 See,	e.g.,	State	v.	Hershberger,	462	N.W.2d	393,	398	(Minn.	1990).		 129.	 [2018]	UKSC	49,	2018	WL	04901027,	¶¶	9–14.	
	 130.	 Id.	¶¶	59–62.	
	 131.	 Id.	at	¶	10.	
	 132.	 Id.	
	 133.	 Id.	at	¶	12.	
	 134.	 Id.	
	 135.	 Id.	
	 136.	 Id.	¶	9.	
	 137.	 Id.	
	 138.	 Id.	at	¶	3.	
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religion,	and	expression.139	Compelled	speech	principles	apply	in	de-termining	whether	Articles	9	and	10	are	violated.140	In	 the	 postscript	 to	 her	 opinion,	 Lady	 Hale	 read	Masterpiece	
Cakeshop	this	way:	The	important	message	from	the	Masterpiece	Bakery	case	is	that	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	refusing	to	produce	a	 cake	 conveying	 a	 particular	 message,	 for	 any	 customer	who	wants	such	a	cake,	and	refusing	to	produce	a	cake	for	the	particular	customer	who	wants	 it	because	of	 that	cus-tomer’s	 characteristics.	 One	 can	 debate	which	 side	 of	 the	line	particular	 factual	 scenarios	 fall.	But	 in	our	 case	 there	can	be	no	doubt.	The	bakery	would	have	refused	to	supply	this	particular	cake	to	anyone,	whatever	their	personal	char-acteristics.	 So	 there	was	 no	 discrimination	 on	 grounds	 of	sexual	orientation.	 If	and	to	 the	extent	 that	 there	was	dis-crimination	on	grounds	of	political	opinion,	no	justification	has	been	shown	for	the	compelled	speech	which	would	be	entailed	for	imposing	civil	 liability	for	refusing	to	fulfil	the	order.141	
	
	 139.	 Id.	at	¶	1.	
	 140.	 Id.	at	¶¶	56–58.	
	 141.	 Id.	¶	62.	The	preceding	paragraphs	parse	the	several	opinions	in	Masterpiece	
Cakeshop:	“The	majority	held	that	“the	delicate	question	of	when	the	free	exercise	of	his	religion	must	yield	to	an	otherwise	valid	exercise	of	state	power	needed	to	be	de-termined	in	an	adjudication	in	which	religious	hostility	on	the	part	of	the	state	itself	would	not	be	a	factor	in	the	balance	the	state	sought	to	reach.	.	.	.	When	the	Colorado	Civil	Rights	Commission	considered	this	case,	it	did	not	do	so	with	the	religious	neu-trality	that	the	Constitution	requires.”	The	majority	recognized	that	businesses	could	not	 generally	 refuse	 to	 supply	 products	 and	 services	 for	 gay	 weddings;	 but	 they	acknowledged	that	the	baker	saw	creating	a	wedding	cake	as	an	expressive	statement	involving	his	First	Amendment	rights;	and	contrasted	the	treatment	that	he	had	re-ceived,	which	they	perceived	as	hostile,	from	the	favorable	treatment	given	to	three	bakers	who	had	refused	to	produce	cakes	with	messages	demeaning	gay	persons	and	gay	marriages.	Justices	Ginsburg	and	Sotomayor,	in	dissent,	drew	a	clear	distinction	between	an	objection	to	the	message	on	the	cake	and	an	objection	to	the	customer	who	wanted	the	cake.	The	other	bakery	cases	had	been	clear	examples	of	an	objection	to	the	message	rather	than	an	objection	to	the	customer.	In	their	view,	the	objection	in	this	case	was	to	the	customer	and	therefore	a	violation.	Justices	Kagan	and	Breyer,	who	voted	with	the	majority	on	the	lack	of	neutrality	point,	also	accepted	that	the	Commission	could	have	based	its	reasoning	on	that	distinction	–	[sic]	the	other	bakers	would	have	refused	to	make	cakes	with	the	demeaning	messages	for	anyone,	whereas	this	baker	had	refused	to	make	this	cake	because	it	was	a	gay	couple	who	wanted	it.	Justices	Thomas	and	Alito,	on	the	other	hand,	considered	that	to	make	a	cake	for	a	gay	wedding	 was	 expressive	 in	 itself	 and	 thus	 compelling	 it	 required	 strict	 scrutiny.	
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The	court	in	Lee	nicely	summarizes	the	ongoing	dilemma:	it	is	not	readily	resolvable.		
An	Addendum	
	Shortly	before	this	article	was	to	be	published	the	Eighth	Circuit	decided	Telescope	Media	Group	v.	Lucero,142	the	latest	case	to	address	the	collision	between	a	state’s	anti-discrimination	law	and	the	First	Amendment	rights	of	business	owners	to	tailor	the	services	they	pro-vide	based	on	their	religious	beliefs.	Angel	and	Carl	Larsen	“are	Christians	who	believe	that	god	has	called	them	to	use	their	talents	and	their	company	to	.	.	.	honor	God.”	They	“shoot,	assemble,	and	edit	the	videos	with	the	goal	of	expressing	their	own	views	about	the	sanctity	of	marriage.”	They	want	to	make	wedding	videos,	but	they	want	to	decline	any	requests	for	their	ser-vices	that	conflict	with	their	religious	beliefs.	The	 Larsens	 will	 “’gladly	 work	 with	 all	 people—regardless	 of	their	race,	sexual	orientation,	sex,	religious	beliefs,	or	any	other	clas-sification.’”143	They	“shoot,	assemble,	and	edit	the	videos	with	the	goal	of	 expressing	 their	 own	 views	 about	 the	 sanctity	 of	marriage,”	 but	they	alleged	that	they	“retain	ultimate	editorial	judgment	and	control”	in	creating	the	videos,144	and	decline	requests	 for	any	services	 that	conflict	with	their	religious	beliefs.145	Their	list	includes	requests	“that,	in	their	view,	‘contradict	bibli-cal	truth;	promote	sexual	immorality;	support	the	destruction	of	un-born	children;	promote	racism	or	racial	division;	incite	violence;	de-grade	women;	or	promote	any	conception	of	marriage	other	than	as	a	lifelong	institution	between	one	man	and	one	woman.’”146	The	Minnesota	Human	Rights	Act	prohibits	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	in	places	of	public	accommodation,147	and	makes	it	“an	unfair	discriminatory	practice	.	.	.	to	deny	any	person	the	full	and	equal	enjoyment	of	the	goods,	services,	facilities,	privileges,	advantages,	and	accommodations	of	a	place	of	public	accommodation		Justice	Gorsuch	would	also	not	have	distinguished	between	a	cake	with	words	and	a	cake	without.”	Id.	(internal	notations	omitted)	
Id.	¶¶	60–61.				142.			No.	17-3352,	2019	WL	3979621,	at	*4	(8th	Cir.	Aug.	23,	2019).				143.			Id.	at	*1.				144.			Id.	at	*4	(8th	Cir.	Aug.	23,	2019)	.				145.			Id.	
			146.			Id.	at	*1.				147.			Minn.	Stat.	§	363A.11,	subd.	1(a)(1)	(2016).		
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because	of	.	.	.	sexual	orientation,”	and	to	“refuse	to	do	business	with,	to	refuse	to	contract	with,	or	to	discriminate	in	the	basic	terms,	con-ditions,	or	performance	of	the	contract	because	of	a	person’s	.	.	.	sexual	orientation	...	,	unless	the	alleged	refusal	or	discrimination	is	because	of	a	legitimate	business	purpose.148	The	Larsens	brought	a	pre-enforcement	challenge	to	these	provi-sions	in	federal	district	court.149	That	court	denied	all	of	their	claims	and	granted	the	defendants’	motion	for	failure	to	state	a	claim	upon	which	relief	could	be	granted.150	The	Larsens	appealed	to	the	Eighth	Circuit,	which	framed	the	is-sue	 as	whether	 “Minnesota	 can	 require	 them	 to	 produce	 videos	 of	same-sex	weddings,	even	if	the	message	would	conflict	with	their	own	religious	 beliefs.”151	 Ten	months	 after	 the	 case	was	 submitted,	 the	court	held	in	a	split	opinion	that	it	could	not.	The	court	held	that	Larsens’	videos	are	a	form	of	speech	subject	to	First	Amendment	protection.	While	the	State	argued	that	it	was	reg-ulating	conduct,	not	speech,	the	court	saw	the	videos	as	a	composition	of	 individual	actions	 that	come	together	 to	produce	 finished	videos	that	are	media	for	the	expression	of	ideas.	As	such,	the	court	held	that	application	of	the	Minnesota	Human	Rights	Act	to	the	Larsens	consti-tuted	 compelled	 speech	 and	 a	 content-based	 regulation	 of	 speech,	triggering	strict	scrutiny.152		The	court	found	the	Supreme	Court’s	opinion	in	Hurley	v.	Irish-
American	Gay,	Lesbian	&	Bisexual	Group	of	Boston,	Inc.,153	“particularly	instructive.”	The	Hurley	Court	acknowledged	that	anti-discrimination	laws	are	generally	constitutional,	but	not	if	in	application	they	require	speakers	 to	 alter	 the	 expressive	 content	 of	 their	 message.154	 The	Court	in	Hurley	concluded	that	it	did.155	The	Larsens	asked	the	Eighth	Circuit	to	draw	the	line	in	their	case	exactly	 as	 Supreme	 Court	 did	 in	Hurley	 by	 preventing	 government	
				148.			Id.	§	363A.17(3).				149.			Telescope	Media	Group	v.	Lindsey,	271	F.Supp.3d	1090,	1097	(D.	Minn.	2017).				150.			Id.	at	1128.				151.			Telescope	Media	Group,	2019	WL	3979621,	at	*1.				152.			Id.	at	*5.				153.			515	U.S.	557	(1995).				154.			Id.	at	572-73.				155.			Id.	at	573	(“This	use	of	the	State’s	power	violates	the	fundamental	rule	of	protection	under	the	First	Amendment,	that	a	speaker	has	the	autonomy	to	choose	the	content	of	his	own	message.”).	
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“from	requiring	their	speech	to	serve	as	a	public	accommodation	for	others,”156	and	the	court	obliged.157	Then,	drawing	on	Supreme	Court	decisions,	some	involving	free-dom	of	association	and	some	a	regulation	of	the	content	of	speech,	the	court	summarized	by	noting	“[t]he	unmistakable	message,”	a	noncon-troversial	one,	of	course,	“is	that	antidiscrimination	laws	can	regulate	conduct,	but	not	expression.”158	As	the	court	saw	it,	acceptance	of	Minnesota’s	position	that	only	conduct	is	regulated,	not	speech,	means	that	the	MHRA	could	be	ap-plied	expansively:	In	theory,	it	could	use	the	MHRA	to	require	a	Muslim	tattoo	artist	to	inscribe	“My	religion	is	the	only	true	religion”	on	the	body	of	a	Christian	if	he	or	she	would	do	the	same	for	a	fel-low	Muslim,	or	it	could	demand	that	an	atheist	musician	per-form	at	an	evangelical	church	service.	In	fact,	 if	Minnesota	were	to	do	what	other	jurisdictions	have	done	and	declare	political	affiliation	or	ideology	to	be	a	protected	characteris-tic,	then	it	could	force	a	Democratic	speechwriter	to	provide	the	same	services	to	a	Republican,	or	it	could	require	a	pro-fessional	entertainer	to	perform	at	rallies	 for	both	the	Re-publican	and	Democratic	candidates	for	the	same	office.159	The	court	held	that	when	“Minnesota	seeks	to	regulate	speech	it-self	as	a	public	accommodation,	it	has	gone	too	far	under	Hurley	and	its	interest	must	give	way	to	the	demands	of	the	First	Amendment,”	but	that	its	“holding	leaves	intact	other	applications	of	the	MHRA	that	do	not	regulate	speech	based	on	its	content	or	otherwise	compel	an	individual	to	speak.”160	The	court	also	held	that	the	Larsens	free	exercise	claim	could	pro-ceed	because	it	fit	within	the	hybrid	claim	exception	in	Employment	
Division,	Department	of	Human	Resources	of	Oregon	v.	Smith.161	While	
Smith	held	that	the	application	of	neutral,	generally	applicable	 laws	that	substantially	burden	a	person’s	free	exercise	rights	will	trigger	only	rational	basis	review,	coupling	the	free	exercise	claim	with	an-other	constitutional	–	creating	a	hybrid	claim	–	will	trigger	strict	scru-tiny.162					156.			Id.	at	*7.				157.			Id.				158.			Id.	at	*8.					159.			Id.	(citations	omitted).				160.			Id.	at	*10.				161.			494	U.S.	872	(1990).				162.			Id.	at	881-82.	
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Minnesota	argued	that	the	Court’s	statement	was	dictum,	but	the	Eighth	Circuit	rejected	the	argument,	concluding	that	it	was	not	dic-tum	and	that	 the	Eighth	Circuit	had	accepted	the	 theory	 in	1991	 in	
Cornerstone	Bible	Church	v.	City	of	Hastings.163	Having	accepted	 the	 theory,	 the	court	acknowledged	 that	 “it	 is	not	at	all	clear	that	the	hybrid-rights	doctrine	will	make	any	real	dif-ference	in	the	end,”	and	that	“given	the	fact	that	the	free	speech	claim	asserted	by	the	Larsens	already	triggers	strict	scrutiny,	so	that	“as	a	practical	matter	.	.	.	the	fact	that	the	videos	have	religious	significance	may	 not	move	 the	 needle	much.”164	The	 court	 left	 it	 to	 the	 district	court	on	remand	to	allow	them	to	develop	the	claim.165	Judge	Kelly	dissented	 from	these	holdings	 in	a	 lengthy	dissent.	She	would	have	held	 that	 the	MHRA	regulates	conduct,	not	speech,	and	that	the	fact	that	the	service	that	the	Larsens	provide	is	expressive	does	not	convert	it	to	a	content-based	regulation	of	speech.166	She	also	rejected	the	hybrid	claim,	in	part	because	she	saw	the	Cornerstone	Bi-
ble	Church	 as	 recognizing	only	a	possibility	 that	Smith’s	dicta	could	support	such	a	claim	and	in	part	because	the	free	speech	claim	failed	as	the	hybrid	link.167	The	conflict	continues,	but	the	analytical	lines	are	drawn.	To	sum-marize,	the	Minnesota	Human	Rights	Act	makes	it	“an	unfair	discrim-inatory	practice	.	.	.	to	deny	any	person	the	full	and	equal	enjoyment	of	the	goods,	services,	facilities,	privileges,	advantages,	and	accommo-dations	of	a	place	of	public	accommodation	because	of	.	.	.	sexual	ori-entation.”	In	Telescope	Media,	 the	 public	 accommodation	 is	 the	wedding	videography	service	the	Larsens	provide,	not	the	simple	sale	of	goods.	The	service	includes	the	creative	production	of	wedding	videos.	That	creation	 is	expressive.	That	expression	 is	 speech.	 Interference	with	that	creative	expression	through	forced	compliance	with	the	MHRA	is	a	content-based	regulation	of	speech	and	it	is	compelled	speech.						163.			948	F.2d	464,	472–73	(8th	Cir.	1991).	The	hybrid	rights	theory	has	been	the	subject	of	a	number	of	articles,	some	of	which	have	been	critical	of	the	concept.	See,	
e.g.,	Steven	H.	Aden	&	Lee	J.	Strang,	When	a	“Rule”	Doesn’t	Rule:	The	Failure	of	the	Or-
egon	Employment	Division	v.	Smith	“Hybrid	Rights	Exception,”	108	PENN.	ST.	L.	REV.	573,	573-74;	Comment,	Ryan	S.	Rummage,	In	Combination:	Using	Hybrid	Rights	to	
Expand	Religious	Liberty,	64	EMORY	L.J.	1175	(2015);	Note,	The	Best	of	A	Bad	Lot:	
Compromise	and	Hybrid	Religious	Exemptions,	123	HARV.	L.	REV.	1494	(2010).				164.			Telescope	Media	Group,	2019	WL	3979621,	at	*11.				165.			Id.				166.			Id.	at	*14	(Kelly,	J.,	concurring	in	part	and	dissenting	in	part).				167.			Id.	at	*27.	
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That	 line	of	argument	 is	short-circuited	 if	 the	application	of	an	anti-discrimination	law	is	viewed	as	a	conduct-based	regulation,	with	an	incidental	impact	on	speech.	At	best,	it	would	trigger	intermediate	scrutiny.				 	
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